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TORTS - DUTY - LIABILITY OF ABU'I"rING PROPERTY OWNER TO ONE
WHO FALLS ON IcE-After having made some purchases in defendant's store,
plaintiff fell on the ice and snow covering the walk in front. Alleging that the
defendant had negligently cleaned the walk by leaving ridges of snow which
melted and froze, forming an uneven surface, the plaintiff and her husband
brought actions against the defendant store owner to recover for the injuries
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sustained. The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held, the plaintiff could not recover because the defendant did not owe a duty to her. Therrien
v. First Nat. Stores, Inc., (R. I. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 731.
Today it is almost axiomatic that the first requisite of any negligence action
is proof of the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.1
The general rule is that the owner or occupant of abutting property does not
owe a duty to the general public to remove snow and ice from the walk.2 An
ordinance requiring the property owner or occupant to remove the snow and
ice will not raise a duty towards the general public. 3 The reason for this view
is that such an ordinance is not designed to protect the general public; it merely
shifts the expense of keeping the walks free from snow and ice to the abutting
owners.4 However, it seems to be well understood that an abutting owner may,
by his own actions in respect to the snow, create an artificial condition which
amounts to a public nuisance, 5 and if a member of the general public suffers
injuries the defendant will be liable. 6 The decision of the principal case was not
based upon the theory of nuisance, but rather upon common-law doctrines of
negligence. The court explicitly held that there was no affirmative duty to clear
the walks of the snow. The most interesting point was its refusal to raise a duty
when the abutting owner voluntarily assumed the task of removing the snow
unless the removal was pursuant to a special agreement entered into with the
plaintiff. 7 The requirement of privity of contract as a condition precedent to
the existence of a duty seems strangely out of place when the action is founded
in tort. 8 Although apparently some courts talk in terms of contractual duties,9
which is reminiscent of the historical foundation of tort liability, it is believed
that the question of the existence of a tort duty should not be based upon the
presence or absence of a special agreement, but rather upon whether it can be
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
43 C. J. II06 (1927); ANGELL and DuRFEE, HIGHWAYS, 3d ed., §§ 264-265
( 1886). The municipality owes a duty to the citizens to use reasonable care in
keeping the sidewalks free from snow and ice. The difficulty in action against the
municipality is not in finding the duty but in determining what amounts to a breach
of the duty.
3 The latest case upon this point is Western Auto Supply Agency of Los Angeles
v. Phelan, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 85.
4 The courts often say that the abutting property owner is the agent of the
municipality.
5 7 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATioNs, 2d ed.,§ 2978 (1928).
6 Thus where an owner swept snow from his lot upon the walk he was held
liable in tort to injured party. Rohling v. Eich, 23 App. Div. 179, 48 N. Y. S. 892
{1897). See also Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E. 501 (1902).
7 For authority it cited Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477 {1870), where a tort
recovery was allowed for injuries arising out of negligent performance by a landlord
of a promise to repair.
8 BoHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw oF ToRTS 86-88 (1926).
9 See WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE, 2d ed., § 435 {1878), for interesting discussion
on the relation •between contractual duties and tort duties. Aspects of this doctrine
still exist in cases where a third party seeks to recover in tort from a manufacturer or
vendor of chattels. See in this connection MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, I I I N. E. 1050 (1915).
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said that the failure on the part of the owner to act reasonably, once he assumes
the task of removing the snow, will create an unreasonable risk of harm to a
class of which this plaintiff is a member.10 Applying this test the court could
have denied the duty upon logical principles of tort law.11 In the latter part of
its decision the court rejects plaintiff's claim of duty based upon the doctrine
laid down in Moch Co. v. Remselaer Water Co.12 This result is proper. This
doctrine of this case is appropriately applied only in a situation where the harm
arises because of the failure to complete an act voluntarily assumed; it is inapplicable in the case of a failure properly to perform an act which by hypothesis has
been completed.18 At least one court has held that where the defendant by a long
course of conduct, assumes the duty of keeping the walks free from snow and
ice and such a course of conduct has come to be relied upon by the plaintiff, a
duty arises to perform the act and to exercise due care in the performance of the
act. 14 No reliance upon such a course of conduct was shown in the principal case.
There is still another possible theory by which a person in the position of the
-plaintiff in the principal case might establish a duty. Although there are no
decisions in point,15 one who has just made purchases in the store might still be
considered a business invitee while on the walk in front. This relation would
establish an affirmative duty and the breach of this duty would give rise to
liability whether the defendant had acted or not. Unless such a duty is invoked,
the result in the principal case seems sound, for it would be unwise to allow
one who did not remove any snow to escape liability, but to hold liable one who
defectively removed snow.16
Robert A. Solomon

10 This is the foreseeability test. It is most effectively set forth in Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N. Y. 339, 163 N. E. 99 (1928).
11 It would seem difficult to say that the situation was unreasonably dangerous.
12 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
18 The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is difficult to ascertain,
but the doctrine has no application in the present case.
14 Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co., 102 Mont. 43, 55 P. (2d) 694 (1936).
15 HARPER, ToRTS, § 97 (1933). It may be possible that the business invitee
relation terminates when the customer leaves the store, but there has been a considerable
enlargement of the doctrine in the past, and this tendency would support its application in this case.
16 Of course, if the defendant's action created an artificial hazard, the result would
be different. See note 5, supra.

